Study of SESAR implied safety validation needs

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Abstract—Safety validation of changes to an individual organization’s local ATM system has become common practice in Europe. However, the SESAR program is planning changes in air traffic operations in Europe that go much further than changes to a local ATM system. This paper identifies the issues on which safety validation approaches need extensions, in order to move from safety validation of changes to a local ATM system to safety validation in SESAR. Subsequently, it identifies approaches that address the identified extension needs. This way an integrated view is developed from the fragmented research results in this area.

Keywords—Safety validation, ATM, SESAR.

I. INTRODUCTION

Safety validation of changes to an individual organization’s local Air Traffic Management (ATM) system has become common practice in Europe. As part of this, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) are required by applicable safety regulations [21],[18] to hand over a positive safety case for regulatory approval prior to introducing a change. However for future changes in ATM, it is highly questionable whether assuring compliance to [21],[18] is effective for SESAR. For example, [21],[18] adopt a conservative approach regarding airborne safety nets: both assume that safety risk reduction by safety nets is taken into account neither in the safety target nor in the safety risk assessment. As a consequence, current regulations may discourage improvements in safety nets [4].

The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) program is planning changes in air traffic operations in Europe that go much further than changes to a local ATM system. SESAR concepts of operations include changes for a multitude of stakeholders including many ANSPs, airlines and airports. The safety of such operations does not only depend on these stakeholders’ individual performance, but also on their interactions. Because SESAR strives for ambitious objectives addressing almost contradictory Key Performance Areas (KPAs)1, the changes to be made are fundamental. This increases even more the importance of addressing safety validation from the concept development start. In early design phases changes to concepts are still relatively easy to make, which makes the provision of feedback to designers the focus of safety validation. Only when the concept of operation matures, the focus of safety validation shifts to derivation of safety requirements and finally confirmation that the concept as developed is indeed safe.

In this paper issues are identified on which safety validation approaches need extensions, in order to move from safety validation of an ANSP’s change to safety validation in SESAR. Subsequently, it is identified which approaches are available to address these extension needs. Although these kinds of questions are being addressed by several researchers inside and outside SESAR, a drawback is that this research is documented in a very fragmented way, which makes it impossible to grasp a complete picture. The aim of this paper is to review these fragmented sources and to provide an integrated view.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II lists relevant studies regarding safety validation needs. Section III discusses safety validation needs identified from SESAR sources. These needs concern two categories: needs regarding organizing safety validation and needs regarding safety assessment. In Sections IV and V approaches are identified that aim to address these two categories of needs. Section VI provides concluding remarks.

II. STUDIES ON SAFETY VALIDATION NEEDS

The methodology widely in use by Air Navigation Service Providers over Europe for safety assessment of changes to their local ATM system is the Air Navigation System Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) [15]. The current section introduces two series of studies addressing additional validation needs. One series of studies has developed the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) [16],[17]. The second series of studies [39]-[48] has been conducted during the SESAR definition phase.

E-OCVM [17] has been developed in order to organize validation from the early concept life-cycle on. E-OCVM provides a common structure to an iterative and incremental approach to operational concept validation, and consists of three elements:

- A Concept Lifecycle Model that reflects the maturity of the concept under investigation (see Fig. 1);
- A Structured Planning Framework that guides planning validation activities; and
- A Case-Based Approach used for providing key stakeholders focused information in an easily understood format.

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1 The KPAs for ATM are [29]: access & equity, capacity, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, environment, flexibility, global interoperability, participation by the ATM community, predictability, safety and security.
The handover by an ANSP of a positive safety case to a regulator as required by [21],[18] effectively applies to phase V4 or V5 of E-OCVM’s Concept Lifecycle Model. E-OCVM however poses specific requirements on the outputs of safety validation at the end of each of the Research and Development (R&D) phases (V0, V1, V2, and V3). Effectively, these specific requirements ask for providing feedback to concept developers helpful to reduce the risks associated with new concepts, and structuring evidence into a presentable format that helps stakeholders identify the answers to their key questions.

During the SESAR definition phase, the safety validation needs that emerge for advanced ATM developments have been studied in [40]-[49]. Each of these studies addresses a specific aspect of importance for safety validation in SESAR. [40] provides an overview of the current ATM safety regulatory framework in Europe; [41] summarizes the basic principles of safety regulation, and presents a vision for the future of ATM safety regulation in which issues identified for the current arrangements are addressed. [42] investigates the elements of the SESAR concepts with respect to the impact on and feasibility for safety regulation, and the impact of regulations on the concept elements. [43] studies the impact of SESAR concepts and procedures on safety regulations. [44] describes regulatory and legislative planning including roadmaps for SESAR’s ‘transversal areas’; these contribute to ensuring that all operational improvements will comply with appropriate safety, security, environment, human performance and contingency requirements and objectives. [45] defines a concept validation methodology that aims to address the complexity of the SESAR concepts. [46] studies the development strategy, including details on aim, content and deliverables in terms of the maturity of the concepts. [47] provides a safety management plan. It aims for an integrated approach to safety related activities, and for establishing an aligned vision for the future of ATM safety that will meet the needs of all stakeholders, now and in the future. [48] describes the system engineering methodology that aims to support SESAR’s technical definition in line with the development strategy of [46]. And finally, [49] defines a master plan for management structures and processes.

III. SAFETY VALIDATION NEEDS IDENTIFIED FROM SESAR SOURCES

This section presents safety validation needs that are identified from the SESAR sources presented in Section II.

Table I provides an overview, distinguishing needs regarding organizing safety validation and needs regarding safety assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs regarding organizing safety validation</th>
<th>Needs regarding safety assessment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Addressing E-OCVM requirements [45]</td>
<td>• Producing a macro safety case [47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managing relations of the safety case with other cases [44]</td>
<td>• Addressing the success side [47]</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Addressing the multi-stakeholder nature [42]</td>
<td>• Covering performance of human operators [47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Addressing future safety regulations [40]</td>
<td>• Identifying unknown emergent risks [47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Covering organizational safety [44]</td>
<td>• Addressing future safety regulations [40]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Needs regarding organizing safety validation

Addressing E-OCVM requirements: [45] identifies the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) [17] as the basis of SESAR’s concept validation methodology. Adherence to E-OCVM requirements aims to ensure that stakeholders can make a well-informed decision on further development of a concept, avoiding that the necessity of concept safety improvement is identified in a late stage of development, when modifications are extremely expensive.

Managing relations of the safety case with other cases: SESAR’s regulatory and legislative planning document [44] identifies the need for an integrated management approach for all KPAs including safety. Management of performance during design phases is organized via E-OCVM’s case-based approach, in which each case focuses on one performance aspect, e.g., safety, business, environment, or human factors.

Cases are usually managed by domain specialists, with the human factors case being managed by human factor specialists, and the safety case by safety analysts. Different domains have different methods and techniques, usually at different levels of consolidation. The result of this partition of work can be a complete separation of the cases, which can affect the efficacy and efficiency of development and validation. There is thus a need to manage relations of the safety case with other cases.

Example results of separation of cases include: 1) real-time simulations focusing on human factor aspects of a concept, without consideration for safety; 2) use of inconsistent assumptions in a safety case and another case, leading to incompatible results and difficulty in interpreting results by decision-makers regarding further concept development.

Addressing the multi-stakeholder nature: [42] identifies that the SESAR operational concept will fundamentally change the roles of many of the ATM stakeholders and, importantly, that these roles will change dynamically within the operation as a flight progresses. This will result in new safety responsibilities and new interfaces between stakeholders. Examples of such changes are in the fields of airspace organization & management, separation provision, and collision avoidance. Necessary precautions should be taken to ensure an appropriate approach towards safety for SESAR in its widest sense. This
includes enabling safe implementation of SESAR concepts, minimizing project risks and related costs, and supporting decision-makers and investors in their requirements to provide information and the discharge of their explicit responsibilities and accountability towards safety in ATM. These conclusions of [42] emphasize the need to properly address the multi-stakeholder-nature of advancing air traffic operations.

An illustration of this need is the development of Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) [33]. The safe execution of CDAs will depend on the roles and collaboration of pilots and air traffic controllers (ATCos). This means that only the reliability of involved interacting technical systems needs to be considered (e.g., via [19]), but also that their overall joint behavior and performance needs to be well analyzed and captured in the CDA development as well as in the safety validation.

**Addressing future safety regulations:** Even though ATM safety regulations have contributed to the successful delivery of an acceptably safe ATM system across Europe so far, significant issues exist with respect to the current regulatory framework. The main issues that might impact safety of a future ATM system identified by [40] are in the field of:

- Solving the fragmentation and variability in regulations over different domains of air transport, and in the interpretation of regulations over European countries;
- Improving safety accountability: The complex safety regulatory framework and the often detailed and prescriptive nature of safety regulations easily result in confusion over safety accountability;
- Reducing duplication of regulations, as overlap and contradictions lead to confusion and difficulty;
- Reducing complexity of regulation, which otherwise leads to ambiguity regarding compliance; and
- Improving cost effectiveness: it should be clear how ATM safety regulation contributes to cost-effective management of safety.

From this, [40] concludes that developing the ATM safety regulatory framework will be essential to the success of SESAR, and that this improvement should aim to provide a clear, unambiguous set of regulations integrated with the safety regulation of the other parts of the air transport industry. In validation of a concept it should thus be realized that it will eventually need to be proven sufficiently safe according to the safety regulatory framework that will be in force at the time of regulatory approval and implementation of the concept.

**B. Needs regarding safety assessment**

**Producing a macro safety case:** SESAR’s safety management plan [47] describes that safety assessments in aviation and ATM industry have often focused on individual concept elements, rather than on the joint effect on safety of multiple changes in air traffic operations. SESAR however is defining advanced developments to air traffic operations, consisting of multiple local changes by various stakeholders. The relations and interactions between such individual operational changes need to be properly assessed. [47] identifies the need for a macro safety case for this, which is to be accompanied by an approach in defining suitable safety targets at an appropriate level for the macro case.

**Addressing the success side:** Safety assessments in aviation and ATM industry have often focused on what happens if a new or changed system fails in some way, whereas the potential positive contribution of the change is often left unaddressed. Likewise, the positive contribution of SESAR to aviation safety should also be considered, instead of focusing on failures of ATM only. From these observations from SESAR’s safety management plan [47] the need to address the success side of a change is identified.

**Covering performance of human operators:** In future concepts proposed by SESAR, human operators will maintain a central position in ATM. Therefore the safety of air traffic operations will remain dependent on the role of human operators. So far, many safety techniques have not comprehensively covered the role of human operators in the ATM system. [47] emphasizes this need to cover performance of human operators appropriately in safety assessments.

**Identifying unknown emergent risks:** In [47] it is explained that with the introduction of advanced SESAR concepts yet unknown emergent risk may appear: new behavior and hazards will emerge that have not yet been seen before. Identification of such emergent risk is crucial to be able to take it into account in safety assessment and feedback to design.

**Covering organizational safety:** SESAR’s regulatory and legislative planning document [44] identifies the need for an integrated management approach for safety and other KPAs. The way in which such management system in the eventual operations will be organized can have significant consequences for safety; therefore organizational aspects need to be taken into consideration in safety assessment.

**IV. APPROACHES ADDRESSING NEEDS REGARDING ORGANIZING SAFETY VALIDATION**

This section presents available approaches for each need identified in Section III.A regarding organizing safety validation.

**A. Addressing E-OCVM requirements**

E-OCVM [17] poses specific, new requirements to safety assessment, which all boil down to optimal information provision for enabling effective and efficient development and validation processes. Only since recently it has been studied how to tailor safety assessment to the maturity of the concept, and how to satisfy the E-OCVM requirements for its R&D phases V0 through V3. Example plans aiming for E-OCVM compliant safety case development for advanced concepts in these phases are available (e.g., [47] and [23]). Table II shows the CAATS II proposed safety validation activities per E-OCVM R&D phase. However, no publicly available examples of E-OCVM compliant safety cases for advanced concepts in these R&D phases have been identified.
### Table II: Safety Validation Activities per E-OCVM Phase (Based on [39])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R&amp;D phase of E-OCVM</th>
<th>Safety validation activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V0: ATM needs</td>
<td>Identification of ATM safety performance needs (e.g., safety targets), and support to the identification of ATM barriers that need to be alleviated to reach the ATM needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V1: Scope</td>
<td>Safety analysis to determine an appropriate validation strategy, and to provide safety feedback to the development process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2: Feasibility</td>
<td>Safety analysis to determine feasibility of the concept, and to provide safety feedback to the development process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3: Integration</td>
<td>Safety analysis to provide evidence for the safety of the further detailed concept, and to provide safety feedback to the development process.</td>
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</table>

### B. Managing relations of the safety case with other cases

The risk of thinking for a safety case is that other validation aspects like human factors or business tend to become out of sight for the safety experts, and the other way around with experts of other cases. Moreover, concept designers do not have the luxury to optimize for each separate case. One design should accommodate all cases. Managing relations between cases in the design phases could improve the efficiency of the validation process and increase the synergies between the analyses done by different experts.

Here, only relations in the field of concept evaluation and validation are considered. Relations with the concept development process are explicitly not considered. Concept development is often a struggle to satisfy objectives in several or all KPAs, with the role of validation being primarily in evaluation of concepts. For example, around airports environment and safety are often in conflict: a procedure developed for noise abatement could negatively impact the safety case. Such relations are not considered here, as decision-makers are primarily responsible for balancing different KPAs, and concept developers are primarily responsible for developing concepts in accordance with the objectives. The validation concerns the evaluation of the proposed concept regarding the KPAs.

Within the CAATS II project, a framework for managing relations between cases has been proposed [8]. As depicted in Figure 2, this framework distinguishes relations between case teams, the case generation processes, the cases themselves, and the outputs. Example relations are: 1) different cases provide complementary but coherent outputs; and 2) different cases use the same validation exercises where possible (e.g., simulations or operational trials).

More specifically, the human factors and safety case clearly relate, with a clear overlap of activities. The experience in handling this overlap effectively is rather under-developed.

With the environment case, no clear overlap or input-output relations of the safety case are identified. A scoping issue is which of these two cases should cover third party risk.

Finally, the business case integrates the results from all other cases, including the safety case. Safety gains or losses caused by the introduction of a new concept must be taken into account in the business case. Models for assessing the economic value of safety gains or losses caused by the new concept are emerging. Also, the eventual cost of a new concept depends on the identification of unsafe elements in the safety case, as these unsafe elements potentially need mitigations or redevelopment, which are costly in time or budget.

### C. Addressing the multi-stakeholder nature

As advanced concepts will fundamentally change the roles of many of the stakeholders in the ATM system and these roles will change dynamically within the operation as a flight progresses, the multi-stakeholder nature of advancing air traffic operations needs to be addressed.

[23] presents a safety validation framework, which has been developed to incorporate active stakeholder roles during the development and validation of a major change in air transport operations. In its detailed alignment with E-OCVM, the focus during the R&D phases V0 to V3 is on the macro level of institutional conditions, i.e., the interactions between stakeholders’ organizations and operational control. Key issue is that during R&D the stakeholders should jointly adopt a goal-oriented approach. This is put in practice via iteration of four processes, in which joint goals are set (set goals), concepts of operations are developed to reach these goals (plan), the consequences for the stakeholders are identified (act), and the concepts are jointly validated (joint safety validation). This is illustrated in Fig. 3. The joint safety validation should ensure that emergent behavior from interactions between the stakeholders is properly addressed.
V. APPROACHES ADDRESSING NEEDS REGARDING SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This section presents available approaches for each need identified in Section III.B regarding safety assessment. Table III provides an overview of identified approaches per safety assessment need.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SESAR safety assessment need</th>
<th>Identified approaches</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Producing a macro safety case</td>
<td>IRP [37]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LVNL safety criteria [55]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOPAZ [5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the success side</td>
<td>System engineering approach [24]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOPAZ [5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covering performance of human operators</td>
<td>Air-Midas [10]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CARA [26]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Assurance Levels [32]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human Factors Case [20]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOPAZ [5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying unknown emergent risks</td>
<td>Hazard brainstorming [12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real-time simulations [1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Systemic Modeling [54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covering organizational safety</td>
<td>Organizational safety modeling [53]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience engineering [28]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scanning on safety fundamentals [51]</td>
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A. Approaches towards producing a macro safety case

The need for a macro safety case has a dual character: on the one hand interactions between different operational improvements need to be analyzed on safety, on the other hand suitable safety targets need to be defined for parts of the novel operation. Three approaches ([37], [55], [5]) are identified towards this.

[37] introduces the Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) which aims to integrate safety assessments for individual operational changes, covering their functional interactions and common causes. This provides a top-down approach considering the ATM system as a whole, complementing a bottom-up approach to assess risks associated to hazards affected or newly generated by the introduction of each individual operational change. A ‘baseline’ (IRP 2005) and a future risk picture version (‘predicted IRP’) have been developed. The predicted version models the safety impacts of all known ATM changes, in order to provide an indication whether safety targets can be achieved and to apportion an overall safety target based on the overall ATM contribution to aviation accident risks. The modeled performance of individual ATM elements is used as safety objectives for safety assessments for individual operational changes. The use of IRP is complemented by a ‘Safety Targets Achievement Roadmap’ [56] to interpolate between the baseline and the eventually foreseen situation, taking into account traffic growth and foreseen implementation planning. [24] proposes the use of predicted IRP for SESAR.

[55] presents an approach in developing safety criteria that are based on extrapolating accident rates from the past. The focus is on those accidents that ATC should prevent. This way, all accidents related to separation provision are considered, irrespective of which stakeholder (e.g., ANSP, airline) has causal contributions to the risk. An overall safety target for
ATC-related accidents are apportioned into safety targets on the level of so-called ATC sub-products, which are comparable to parts of a flight forming a logical element within an ATC unit (e.g., taxiing, line-up). [55] proposes that safety assessments consider one or more operational improvements and connect this at the level of the ATC sub-products.

[5] presents the TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) methodology for safety analysis of advanced air traffic operations. It addresses jointly all types of safety issues, including organizational, environmental, human-related and other hazards, and all combinations. Notably, it also considers all stakeholders relevant to the operation in an integrated way, enabling to cover well interactions such as between pilots and ATCos. It makes use of safety relevant scenarios that model the combinatorially many possible interactions between hazards and elements under control by different stakeholders. It features development and subsequent use of a Monte Carlo simulation tool set for selected parts of advanced operations. For other parts and other design options, possibilities are to adopt a qualitative approach, to use sensitivity analysis of the simulations of selected parts, to rerun simulations with adapted parameter settings, and to perform an advanced bias and uncertainty assessment.

B. Approaches in addressing the success side

Whereas safety assessments in aviation and ATM industry have often focused on failures of new systems, there is a need to address the success side of the change. Two approaches ([24], [5]) are identified for this.

[24] presents a system engineering approach to assessing safety. This approach extends upon SAM [15] by adopting the ‘broader approach to safety assessment’ of [25], consisting of complementary success and failure approaches:

- The success approach seeks to show that an ATM system will be acceptably safe in absence of failure;
- The failure approach seeks to show that an ATM system will still be acceptably safe, taking into account the possibility of (infrequent) failure.

This broader approach aims to translate future safety targets that apply to aircraft flights under the operational environment properties of SESAR, to a high level specification of ATM services and their safety objectives. To accomplish this, the broader approach makes use of the predicted IRP [37].

Since its development, the safety assessment methodology TOPAZ [5] has considered success and failure in an integrated way. Hence, it forms a proven approach to covering both the success and failure side of a change. The method uses safety relevant scenarios in which it is modeled how the resolution of hazardous situations depends on the performance of multiple elements, acknowledging that performance variability goes further than the occurrence of failures, and that this plays an important role in safety.

C. Approaches in covering performance of human operators

As safety of air traffic operations will remain dependent on human operators, there is a need to cover their performance appropriately in safety assessments. Five approaches ([10], [26], [32], [20], [5]) are identified for ATM.

Air Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (Air-Midas) [10] is a predictive modeling approach for human operator performance (flight crew, ATC) to evaluate the impact of automation developments in flight management and ATC.

Controller Action Reliability Assessment (CARA) [26] is a human reliability assessment technique, which can be used to quantify human reliability aspects as failure rates and success of mitigation actions in ATM.

[32] explores the use of Human Assurance Levels (HALs), which aim to ensure an appropriate level of Human Factors consideration/integration in the system design and working practices commensurate with the risk for a particular system function relying on human performance. These HALs are then used at the leaves of fault/event trees.

EUROCONTROL’s Human Factors Case [20] is a process to systematically manage the identification and treatment of Human Factor issues early in a concept’s lifecycle. In the CAATS II project [7], this Human Factors Case has been formalized for use in R&D in line with E-OCVM. Practices for managing relations between a safety case and a Human Factors case during R&D have already been discussed in Section IV.B.

TOPAZ [5] approach includes a systematic way of incorporating human performance modeling and simulation for ATCos and pilots (e.g., [3]). In [52] this has been extended with a systematic way of modeling the propagation of multi-agent situation awareness differences. In [2] it is explained that while Air-MIDAS is more detailed regarding ATCo and pilot performance, TOPAZ focuses on ATCo and pilot performance impact on accident risk. [11] shows that integration of the two approaches may be of complementary value for both.

D. Approaches in identifying unknown emergent risks

With the introduction of advanced concepts as aimed for by SESAR, unknown emergent risk may appear. Such risk is related to ‘emergent behavior’ which is characterized by what the interaction between multiple local behaviors (both nominal and non-nominal) yields more than the sum of the local behaviors. Three approaches ([12], [1], [54]) are identified.

Hazard brainstorming approaches with experienced pilots and ATCos can be used for identification of emergent risk. HAZID (Hazard Identification, e.g., [9]) aims to identify human failures more effectively by keeping identification separated from hazard analysis and risk mitigation. [12] presents a brainstorming approach that makes use of scenario-thinking rather than application of keywords, using a focus on identification of functionally unimaginable hazards. [13] shows that this can drastically increase the effectiveness over HAZID [9].

Real-time simulations (e.g., [1]) may be used for identification of emergent risk, including risk related to emerging dynamics and interactions of the various elements in foreseen air transport operations. Inserting non-nominal events in the simulations can stimulate this. Risk identification via
Expert elicitation can also be improved by involving operational experts in real-time simulations [36].

Recently, there has been a considerable impetus in safety science by approaches for risk assessment by systemic accident models ([27], [28], [31]). Systematic accident models describe the performance of a system as a whole, rather than on the level of events that may go wrong and related cause-effect mechanisms (as fault and event trees). The systemic approach considers accidents as phenomena emergent from variability in performance of interacting entities in an organization. There are four systemic risk models in literature for application to ATM: STAMP [31], FRAM [28], IRP [37] and TOPAZ [54]. Stochastic analysis and large scale Monte Carlo simulation of a systemic model, developed with the latter approach, allows filtration of emergent risks from the huge number of less relevant ones. For an active runway crossing operation, [6] compares a safety assessment using stochastic analysis and large scale Monte Carlo simulation with a systemic model versus an event sequence based safety assessment. This showed a significant difference in results due to explicit modeling of the dynamics of the operation, and the concurrent and interacting behaviors of pilots and controllers, which leads to emergent behavior that was neither identified through brainstorming nor through the event sequence based approach [6].

E. Approaches in covering organizational safety

The way in which future ATM will be organized can have significant consequences for safety. Therefore, organizational aspects need to be taken into account in safety assessment. Three approaches ([53], [28], [51]) are identified.

Organizational safety modeling for ATM is being studied in [53], and goes one step further than modeling humans and interactions between multiple humans, in the sense that groups of humans and interactions within and between groups are also considered. In [53], this is done through combined agent- and role-based modeling. The evaluation formalisms used include Bayesian Belief Nets and Monte Carlo simulations.

Resilience engineering [28] acknowledges that safety does not only depend on risk related to breakdown or malfunction, but also on the ability of a system to adjust to current conditions, which continuously change due to the complexity of air traffic operations. Resilience is often reached via a human cognition contribution, e.g., via coordination in air traffic operations. Resilience is often reached via a systemic approach [6].

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has shown that several SESAR-identified safety validation needs exist beyond those of ANSPs. These needs appear to be of two categories:

- Needs regarding organizing safety validation, and
- Needs regarding safety assessment.

For each of the identified safety validation needs, relevant approaches have been described. For the needs regarding organizing safety validation, promising approaches are in an early phase of application. For the needs regarding safety assessment, there are multiple approaches (see Table III), of which some have proven to work, and some are new. The experience with the identified approaches is not widely spread. It is recommended to gain experiences with the novel approaches, and to study the complementarity and integration of different approaches in order to combine their strengths.

The expectation is that most of the needs and approaches discussed in this paper also apply to NextGen. Although significant differences exist regarding ATM organization, gaining experience will improve from collaboration between SESAR and NextGen in safety validation.

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